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Introduction
After ten years of decaying, the Yugoslav economy faced the challenge of undertaking
swift reforms to meet high expectations upon democratic changes in October 2000.
Macroeconomic stabilization  has been a first step and a necessary condition for the
recovery. This paper deals with the first, crucial, year of stabilization by exploring
challenges and sustainability of the stabilization while extensively documenting it.
At the outset of reforms, GDP per capita slightly exceeded 40% of the one in the second
half of the ‘80s. During last decade the living standard decreased by over 50%. The
average net monthly wage was less than 90 DM, while the open and hidden
unemployment is estimated to be around 35%. Poverty escalated compared both to the
recent Yugoslav records and the regional standards. It is estimated that the 35% of the
population were below the regional poverty line, and additionally 35% just above the
poverty line. All these built up large expectations for living standard improvements at the
very beginning of stabilization, which by definition implies some austerity measures.
Inflation and monetary control was on the top of agenda, in order to prevent outburst of
inflation upon extensive price liberalization. This task was somewhat eased by the fact
that the economy was placed in ‘bad equilibrium’ at the start of stabilization (cf. Sachs
1994?). Namely, the economy exhibited large real depreciation of domestic currency,
extremely low levels of real money holdings and a large informal sector. A credible
stabilization thus offered a ‘free lunch’, that is a sharp increase in real money demand
that has been used to build up foreign currency reserves; large real appreciation of
domestic currency that restrained inflation by using nominal exchange rate as an anchor,
and enhanced tax collection by broadening the tax base, which helped keeping the budget
deficit under control.
Prices and wages in the public sector had to be adjusted. Utility prices, in particular
electricity tariff, were well below operating costs at the start of the Program. This
indicates the existence of the large quasi-fiscal deficit, which should be addressed if
sustainable stabilization is to be achieved. On the other hand, wages in these enterprises
were well above the average in the economy, suggesting their control thus lending
opportunity to restraint over all wage increase.
Fiscal adjustments are decisive for lasting stabilization. The estimated fiscal deficit,
explicit and implicit, was around 10% of GDP at the beginning of the Program. Tax
reform has been enacted that broaden tax base and increased the revenues, as opposed to
most other transition economies where tax base eroded (cf. Wyplosz, 1999). Strict
expenditure control and higher revenues resulted into very low fiscal deficit in the first
year. Prospect for the second year is higher but sustainable deficit to be accompanied,4
however, with large share of public consumption in GDP. Although Yugoslavia shares
the latter with CEE countries, some medium term reforms and adjustments are due.
Medium term viability is tentatively explored. Vulnerability indicators (cf. EBRD, 1999)
suggest that fiscal deficit and external debt might be sustainable, while the main threat
could come from the current account deficit. Structural reforms, that should also prevent
reversals, are well on the way. Privatization law, with accompanying decrees, as well as
Labor law has been accepted. Thus foundation for privatization and enterprise
restructuring has been laid down. Three cement plants have been already sold to foreign
investors. Bold measures are undertaken in bank restructuring by closing insolvent four
largest banks that are state owned. These reforms are expected to eliminate soft budget
constraint, hence decreasing the chances for facing crises and reversals in the future.
A.  Main Macroeconomic Imbalances
I.   Background
Upon disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro (FRY)
experienced during 1992-93 second highest and second longest hyperinflation in
economic history. It was driven by excessive money supply that monetized deficits at
various levels which emerged upon disintegration of the former country, introduction of
UN embargo and the war in the region (see Petrovic, Bogetic and Vujosevic, 1999). In
January 1994 hyperinflation was abruptly halted and the economy underwent sharp
remonetization through June 1994.
From mid 1994 through summer 1998, the economy went through cycles of short-lived
macroeconomic stability and high, but not excessive inflation, i.e. around 50% per
annum. In fall 1998, Kosovo conflict was pending and in spring 1999 the war broke out.
As a consequence, the economy further deteriorated as the output sharply declined,
domestic currency strongly depreciated in real terms hand in hand with ran away from
dinar (demonetization). (See Petrovic, Arsic and Dragutinovic, 2000)
In order to identify medium term pattern and explore structural causes of instability,
relevant for studying macroeconomic adjustments, one should therefore focus on 1994 –
1998 period.
Upon causing and experiencing hyperinflation, authorities were reluctant to opt for
extensive money printing in this period. However unreformed economy pressed for the
loose monetary policy. The resulting dynamics of the main nominal magnitudes are
depicted in Table 1.
Table 15
                            Dynamics of Money, Prices, Exchange and Wage Rates
                                                         Growth rates
-End of period, in %
1994
1)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Money supply
(M1)
1199.4 33.7 68.8 73.7 13.4 45.7 91.5
Base money (H) 545.8 71.6 63.6 70.3 9.7 38.0 117.4
Inflation 0.0 120.2 58.7 9.3 44.3 58.6
2)
113.3
Exchange rate 50.0 126.7 14.7 28.2 63.0 157.7 42.9
Wages 984.7 63.0 91.0 9.9 37.3 39.7 132.6
                    1) Dec. 1994. / Feb. 1994.   2) Corrected official data
As can be seen, all nominal magnitudes grew at the average rate of around 40 to 50% in
1994-98 period, indicating macroeconomic instability. This is also demonstrated by
monthly dynamics depicted in Figure 1, which clearly points to co-movement of money
supply, price level and market exchange rate.
Figure 1
Dynamics of Money Supply (M1), the Price Level (P) and Market Exchange Rate (E)
                                    (July 1994. = 100)
The Figure 1 suggests a conjecture to be tested, that money growth drove the price level
and exchange rate, hence causing macroeconomic instability.
A consequence of the pursued macroeconomic policy, attempting from time to time to




1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
M1/GDP* 9.44 5.18 5.96 7.98 5.79 5.95 5.30 6.53
H/GDP* 5.16 3.63 4.05 5.32 3.74 3.64 3.50 4.19
*) GDP end of period price level. H is monetary base.
As shown in Table 2, the share of M1 in GDP was 6%, for most of the period, which is
well below 15%, that is the historical figure for the ‘80s. Low real money demand for6
domestic currency indicates that public perceived economic policy, during second half of
the ‘90s, as completely non-credible.
Further implication of modest real money holdings is relatively low seigniorage despite
high growth of money supply.
Table 3
                                                            SEIGNIORAGE
- In percent
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
DM1/GDP 9.32 1.86 2.83 3.58 0.80 2.42 4.00 3.55
DH/GDP 4.66 2.16 1.84 2.33 0.39 1.30 3.14 2.26
Thus despite high money growth, the collected seigniorage could finance only relatively
small fiscal deficit of approximately 2% of GDP.
II Inflation, Wage and Exchange Rate Determination: Some Econometric Evidence
The issues that we want to explore in this section are as follows. What was the driving
force behind the nominal variables: money supply, price level, wage and exchange rates.
In particular whether they have been driven by money supply that monetized fiscal and
quasi-fiscal deficits, i.e. fiscal view, or by exchange rate i.e. balance of payment view?
Was there direct relationship between money supply and wages, indicating the presence
of soft budget constraint? How nominal exchange rate was determined? Whether there is
a conflict between real depreciation of currency and real wage increase? Finally, whether
the Cagan type of money demand schedule can explain low monetization observed in the
Yugoslav economy?
1. Testing and Estimating Long-run Relationships
Methodology used is the cointegration analysis i.e. testing and identification of long-run
relationships. Monthly data for logs of M1 (m), price level (p), wage (w) and exchange
(e) rates, for the period June 1994 – September 1998 are used. All four series are
nonstationary, I(1). Thus we proceed to test for cointegration, and the results are reported
in Table 4.
Table 4
Testing Cointegration among Price Level,
Wage Rate, Exchange Rate, and Base Money7
                                                        July 1994 – September 1998
 rank Eigenvalue  trace test
 R=0   0.50  78.73
 r£1   0.36  44.05
 r£2   0.26   22.06
 r£3   0.12   6.72
Note:  There are 2 lags in the VAR. The 5% critical values for the trace tests are as follows: 53.42 for r=0, 34.79 for r£ 1,
19.99 for  r £ 2 and 9.13 for r £ 3 (Hansen and Juselius, 1995).
Cointegration tests indicate that there are three cointegrating vectors (long-run
relationships) among the variables considered. The estimates of these vectors are reported
in Table 5.
Table 5
Estimated  Cointegrating Vectors
  variable b1 b2 b3
   P 0.10 -1.85    1
   E -1.50 1   -0.19
   W   1 1.73  -0.75
    M    0.51 -0.73 -0.04
  Constant   -10.09 4.26 -0.27
These estimates indicate that the first vector (column) might represent a relationship
between wages and money supply, the second vector (column) could be the relationship
between the exchange rate and money supply, and the third vector (column) might
indicate that price level depends on wage and exchange rate.
Upon imposing the restrictions above, the following estimates are obtained (Table 6)
Table 6
Estimates Under Imposed Restrictions
On The Cointegration Vectors
Chi
2(2) = 0.77(0.68)
  variable b1 b2 b3
   P    0 0    1
   E   0 1   -0.21
   W   1 0  -0.83
    M    -0.79 -1 08
  Constant   0 7.58 0
The Chi square (2) statistics indicates that restrictions imposed cannot be refuted.
2. Money Supply Caused Macroeconomic Instability
As the result of cointegration testing and estimation, the following long-run relationships
are identified:
p = 0.83w + 0.21e    (1)
e = m – 7.58            (2)
w = 0.79m                 (3)
First equation indicates mark-up pricing, i.e. the price level is determined by wage and
import costs. Exchange rate is determined, in the second equation, by money supply.
Third equation points to the peculiar long-run relationship between wages and money
supply, as opposed to expected relation between money supply and the price level.
In order to determine endogeneity and weak exogeneity in eqs. (1) to (3) above, the
corresponding Error-correction models (ECM) are estimated. They also capture the short-
run dynamics of the variables.
dp = 0.054-0.16(p-0.21e-0.83w)-1+0.51dp-3                (4)
        (4.64)   (-3.78)                   (5.52)
R
2=0.45 Q (12)=14.98(0.24)
de = 0.044-0.058(e-m+7.6)-1+0.340de-3               (5)
        (4.40)   (-2.10)                     (2.50)
R
2=0.16 Q (12)=14.16(0.29)
dw = -0.115-0.176(w-0.79m)-1 +0.332(p-0.21e-0.83w)-1-0.324dw-1             (6)
        (-2.47)   (-2.97)                  (2.95)                            (-2.20)9
R
2=0.46 Q (12)=10.98(0.53)
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Q is the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test of order 12 with p-values in parentheses. d
stands for the first difference of variables and since they are logs, d represents growth rate.
Thus ECM (4) indicates that the price level does adjust to wage rate and exchange rate, as
suggested in eq. (1), while ECM (5) confirms that exchange rate adjusts to money supply,
supporting eq. 2. Wages (ECM 6) are determined by money supply, as suggested in eq.
(3), but are also indexed to the price level and exchange rate.
Putting these results together, one gets that money supply is the exogenous variable in the
above system of cointegrated variables, thus driving wages, exchange rate and the price
level. Consequently, it is the monetization of fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits, i.e. the fiscal
view, which explains macroeconomic instability in the Yugoslav economy.
The identified relationship between wage rate and money supply (eq. 3) points to the soft
budget constraint where increases in money supply spill over directly into wage increase.
Namely, the loose monetary policy has led to immediate wage increase in the
environment of unreformed, dominantly socially owned Yugoslav economy.
The long-run relationship between exchange rate and money supply (eq. 2) supports
monetary model of exchange rate determination. In this model (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1997) exchange rate is determined by future dynamics of money supply. Corresponding
present value model (PVM) of exchange rate determination reduces to relationship
between current exchange rate and money supply, i.e. eq. (2), when money supply
follows the random walk (I(1)), which is exactly our case. Thus eq. (2) says that money
supply, as the fundamental, determines exchange rate.
The corresponding ECM (5) shows that exchange rate does adjust (de) to its deviation
from fundamental: e-m (also Mark 1995). However, the pace of adjustment is relatively
slow, since the adjustment coefficient (0.058) is rather small.
The result that exchange rate is determined by money supply is a legacy of the
hyperinflation that Yugoslavia experienced in1992 and 1993. In extreme case, like
hyperinflation, one would expect monetary model to hold as it has been confirmed for the
Yugoslav hyperinflation (see Petrovic and Mladenovic, 2000).  The fact that even upon
halting hyperinflation exchange rate depends directly on money supply indicates a low
credibility of stabilization policy. The econometric result above is also supported by ad
hoc evidence when, e.g. in December 1996, an increase in money supply in the course of
weeks initiate exchange rate depreciation. The price level adjusts later on with
considerable lag, and partly.10
Price level (eq. 1) is dominantly determined by labor cost, with elasticity (0.83) being
much higher than the one for exchange rate (0.21). Money supply affects price level only
through wages and exchange rate. The eq. (1) indicates that the prices are sticky with
respect to exchange rate. Additionally, real exchange rate is nonstationary, i.e. price level
does not adjust directly to exchange rate. This empirical evidence indicates that the law
of one price is far from being true in the Yugoslav economy, the result that could be
expected in the relatively closed economy in the '90s.
Since the elasticity of the price level with respect to exchange rate (0.21) and wage rate
(0.83) approximately adds to one, the long-run relationship between real wage rate (w-p)
and real exchange rate (e-p) can be derived:
(w-p) = -0.25(e-p)         (7)
Causation runs from real exchange rate to real wage rate, as implied in eq. 7, since real
exchange rate is weakly exogenous in the cointegrated relationship above. The
corresponding ECM demonstrates this:
d(w-p) = -0.109 - 0.407[(w-p)+0.25(ex-p)]-1 -0.185d(w-p)-1                  (8)
                (-3.39)  (-4.17)                               (-1.93)
R
2=0.32 Q (12)=14.80(0.25)
Thus there is the long-run trade-off  (conflict) between real wage rate and real exchange
rate implying that real devaluation leads to decrease in real wages. This result stems from
the mark-up pricing above.
B. Macroeconomic Stabilization
I.  Money and Exchange Rate11
1. Background
Upon democratic changes in October 2000, the Yugoslav economy was facing large
macroeconomic imbalances. Apart from the structural imbalances, the immediate
concerns were those related to extensive price control and repressed inflation, sharp
demonetization of economy and extreme real depreciation of dinar. This starting position
threatened to explode into high inflation and possibly hyperinflation. Hence, the
immediate concern was to achieve monetary and exchange rate stability in order to
prevent price explosion.
Price control was widely practiced in 1999 and 2000 as a substitute for the social policy
and to repress the inflation. There were direct and indirect price controls, but also
unofficial one, often without any adequate legal basis.
Direct price control, was applied to staple food products, electricity, oil and oil
derivatives, a majority of pharmaceuticals, basic hygiene products, some chemical
products and main public services. We estimate that over 40% retail trade of goods and
services were under direct price control.
Indirect price control, binding enterprises to report price changes, increased in addition
the scope of control. Furthermore, during the second half of 1999 and through September
2000, unofficial price control was extensively practiced. Antimonopoly regulations are
mainly misused to control directly the prices that are supposed to be freely set. In
addition, pressures were exerted on enterprises not to increase prices even if they were
formally allowed to do so. The informal pressures were pursued through frequent and
excessive administrative control and selectively fining the companies for what in fact
were “normal”, widespread operations.
Thus the government was able to influence or determine the prices of practically all
products and services and it used it extensively through the end of September 2000. The
main consequences were enormous price disparities, high losses in enterprise sector,
shortages and expansion of gray economy.
As has been demonstrated in the section A, the Yugoslav economy exhibited the low
level of monetization in the ‘90s. However, in 1999 and through September 2000 real
demand for money decreased even further as a consequence of additional deterioration of
the Yugoslav economy in these years.
The real money demand by the end of 1999 was 750 mil. DEM and further decreased to
650 mil. DEM by the end of September 2001. Compared to the already low level of
demand by the end of 1998 (1340 mil. DEM), real money holdings halved during the first
three quarters of 2000.  However, part of this decrease is due to sharp real depreciation of
dinar in the period considered. By September 2000, real exchange rate of dinar decreased
to 56% compared to the average level for the period 1994 – 98.12
Outgoing government lifted price control at the beginning of October 2000. Obviously,
this was politically motivated since the measure was isolated and not a part of a
stabilization package. The repressed inflation became the open one, and it surged in
October and November to 27% and 19% respectively. Later on, as a consequence of
monetary and exchange rate policy, inflation was put under control.
Wages reacted to this price increase and succeeded to catch up through December 2000.
The wage increase was partly made possible by donations, some of which were
channeled to the wages in the public sector. By the end of 2000, the real wage rate was
1% higher than the average rate for the whole year. This put some pressure on the wage
increase in 2001 compared to 2000, since the level achieved in December was perceived
as the starting point.
Table 7













Jul-00 2.9 4.9 1.7 104.3
Aug-00 4.7 9.8 0.6 105.0
Sep-00 7.7 6.8 -4.4 100.4
Oct-00 26.6 13.5 -8.4 91.9
Nov-00 19.0 13.0 0.0 91.9
Dec-00 2.8 22.9 9.9 101.0
Jan-01 3.2 -5.9 -8.8 92.1
Feb-01 3.3  7.0 5.4 97.0
Mar-01 0.9  4.3 1.9 98.9
2. Initial Macroeconomic Stabilization: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
The initial macroeconomic policy of the new government, that also encompassed the Post
conflict program agreed with IMF, focused on monetary and exchange rate policy and
temporary fiscal adjustment that would prevent deficits and their monetization. In
particular, temporary balanced budget for the first quarter has been established for Serbia;13
this budget, including pension and health care funds, account for the major part of fiscal
expenditure in Yugoslavia. The balanced Federal budget was also accepted.
The basic idea of the initial stabilization policy has been to regulate money supply only
through foreign exchange operation, while at the same time fixing exchange rate at its
black market rate and subsequently opting for the managed float.
Table 8 illustrates money supply process. Net domestic assets were kept constant in the
last quarter of 2000, decreased in the first quarter of 2001, and than remain constant
through August, hence being well below initial September 2000 level. At the same time




Monetary Base (H), Money Supply (M1) and Net Domestic Assets (NDA)
- Mil. dinars
H M1 NDA
Dec. 1999 9421.6 15986.6 32010.0
Sep. 2000 14218.4 22996.9 39857.0
Dec. 2000 19832.5 30194.7 39314.0
Mar. 2001 19815.0 34782.3 34669.0
Jun. 2001 24623.0 43010.6 35770.0
Aug. 2001 27468.4 48546.5 34108.0
Sep. 2001 31464.4 52956.5 37081.0
Nov. 2001 34698.3 56939.1 36359.0
The previous pattern implies increase in foreign exchange reserves, as demonstrated in
Table 9. They were substantially raised from the start of the program through August
2001, i.e. by 219%.
Table 9
Foreign Exchange Reserves of NBY










Thus the growth in money supply simply accommodated increase in real money demand
through foreign currency operation, and hence was not inflationary.
By the end of August and through September NBY started the lending to the Government
of Serbia, by extending 3.2 billion dinars. This was envisaged by Stand-by agreement
concluded with IMF in June 2001, thus ending a quasi currency board arrangement
practiced during first eleven months of stabilization. Consequently, Net Domestic Assets
increased substantially by the end of September as shown in Table 8. Additional NBY
loan to the Government was extended end of October, reaching the total of 3.7 billion out
of 4 billion dinars agreed with IMF for 2001.
NDA at the end of September 2001, and in fact also end of November, are still lower than
those at the beginning of stabilization (September 2000), hence contributing to the
decrease of base money. Thus money creation through November 2001 was exclusively
due to increase in foreign exchange reserve which is partly offset by decrease in NDA.
As an illustration, in the first nine months of 2001 the base money grew somewhat less
than 60%; increase in foreign reserves contributed 70% while decline in NDA offset the
latter by somewhat more than 10%.
As NDA decreased in 2001, it opend the room for extra NBY lending to the Government
of Serbia budget in November and December, and this opportunity was realized.
Real money demand, in terms of foreign currency, sharply increased (61%) in the last
quarter of 2000. This is expected both due to the extremely low level of monetization and
the new monetary and exchange rate policy that immediately regained some credibility.
The large shifts in real money demand, like the one above, were already observed in the
second half of the ‘90s. Real money holdings in terms of foreign currency further









Sep. 2000 100.0 647.2
Dec.2000 86.7 1006.5
Mar. 2001 93.1 1159.4
Jun. 2001 100.1 1433.7
Sep. 2001 115.6 1765.2
Nov. 2001 118.5 1866.9
Measuring real money holdings in terms of foreign currency are somewhat biased since
real depreciation of the domestic currency tends to exaggerate demonetization, while real
appreciation overestimates remonetization. Thus the big growth of real money holdings
in the first year of stabilization (173%) is substantially due to large real appreciation of
dinar.
Real money demand measured as nominal money deflated with the price level has also
set backs, due to extensive price control in 1999 and through September 2000. This
explains relatively high ‘level of monetization’ in September 2000, which is, due to price
control, obviously spurious. Furthermore, the subsequent reduction in real money
holdings through December 2000, is the consequence of price liberalization rather than
decrease in real money demand. Therefore, in order to assess remonetization one should
take December 2000 as a starting point. The resulting increase through September 2001 is
33%.
Whether we measure real money demand in terms of foreign currency or deflated with
price level, it is still, after one year of stabilization, below the maximum of the pre reform
1994-2000 period. In fact this is true even for end of November 2001.
The exchange rate was fixed in October 2000 at its parallel market value (30 dinars for 1
DEM), which was five times greater than official one (6 dinars). However, this was just
recognizing actual state of affairs since hardly any transactions had been done at the
official rate. At the same time internal convertibility was introduced and exchange rates
unified. In December 2000 managed float was introduced. All above brought back most
of the transactions from parallel to official market, and led to the observed remonetization
by increasing foreign currency reserves.
As explained above, dinar exhibited large real depreciation at the parallel market in 1999
and through September 2000. This opened the room for dinar to appreciate in real terms
in the period of initial stabilization, which in fact happened. Thus, exchange rate was
used as a nominal anchor since it hardly changed during the first year of stabilization
(from 30 to 30.5 dinars for one DEM). This policy helped stabilizing inflation after it
surged in October and November 2000, and prevents outburst of new inflation upon
administrative increase in prices during 2001. However, this also led to large real
appreciation of dinar, as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2.   Real Exchange Rate (E*Pf/P) (average 1994-98=100)16
Real exchange rate in Figure 2 is obtained by deflating nominal exchange rate by
domestic price level (P) and correcting with German inflation (Pf). It shows that, upon
large real appreciation in the first year of the stabilization, real exchange rate reached the
average level for the period 1994-98, thus exhausting the initial space for real
appreciation. Consequently, further appreciation should be supported by improvements in
the economy in order to be sustainable.
Another way to asses whether the exchange rate represent a threat to balance of payment
and external competitiveness, is to combine it with wage rate. As depicted in Figure 3,
average monthly net wage rate reached 200 DM in September 2001. Judging from its
historical levels given in Figure 3, wage rate in terms of DM reached its sustainable level,
and further increase should hinge on productivity growth. International comparisons
indicate that 120% increase in DM wage observed in Yugoslavia during the first year of
stabilization is not extreme. Namely, in transition economies, the dollar wage increase
from tough or first available data varies in the medium range from 75% to 173%,
although extremes are 43% and almost 600% (cf. Halpern and Wyplosz, 1998).
Figure 3. Real wages in DEM
Comparing foreign currency reserves with monetary aggregates can also give assessment
of the exchange rate sustainability. After one year of the Program foreign currency
reserves are 30% greater than M1 and 80% than monetary base, indicating that current
rate can be easily defended. At the same time, the reserves cover 3.4 months of import,
showing that for time being there is no treat from the balance of payment to the exchange
rate.
3. Assessments and Outlook
Monetary and exchange rate policy, in the first year of stabilization, took advantage of a
starting position characterized by extreme demonetization and real depreciation of
domestic currency. In a sense, the initial position offered a free lunch. Extremely low
level of domestic money real holdings, at the start of the Program, allowed money supply
(base money) more than double within a year without being inflationary. This increase in
real money demand was used to build up foreign reserves.
On the other hand, excessive initial under valuation of dinar left the space to effectively
fix exchange rate for one year, thus using it as a nominal anchor. This allowed keeping
inflation under control upon, first, extensive price liberalization, and subsequently17
administrative price adjustments and tax reform.  Hence the space for real appreciation of
dinar allowed pursuing price liberalization and administrative price adjustments. Large
average on average real appreciation in 2001 over 2000 (60 %) will have considerable
carry over effect in 2002, estimated at 13%. Namely, beginning of January 2002 the
value of dinar in real terms is expected to be 13% higher than the average for 2001. Dinar
will additionally appreciate during 2002 due administrative price changes, leading to
overall (average on average) real appreciation of 19%.
After one year of stabilization, the advantage of the starting position is, by and large,
exhausted. The level of real money demand and the real value of dinar are, respectively,
in the range of maximum and average historical values in the ‘90s. Therefore, further
improvements imply structural changes that would move the economy away from its
performance in the ‘90s.
Following the experience of other transition economies, additional real appreciation of
domestic currency could be expected in the medium term. The common pattern exhibited
by transition economies (cf. De Broeck and Slok, 2001) is the initial collapse of real
exchange rate and then catching up to some equilibrium level. Thereafter additional real
appreciation takes place due to convergence of productivity towards those in developed
economies and due to supplementary transition specific productivity gains.
The Yugoslav economy already experienced initial collapse of exchange rate in pre
stabilization years and catching up phase in the first year of the Program. Productivity
growth and some farther administrative increase of non-tradable prices will drive real
appreciation in the medium term. We estimate that in the period 2003 through 2006, dinar
could appreciate by 12% (cf. Table 29). A tentative time profile is given in Table 28 in
Section V.
3.1 Explaining Remonetization: Real Money Demand
The following estimates demonstrate that real money demand during the first year of
stabilization exhibits the same pattern as in the ‘90s. They also explain the low level of
real money holdings in the ‘90s.
As demonstrated in the Section I, even upon halting hyperinflation low level of
monetization remains in the Yugoslav economy (cf. Table 2). This is the consequence of
non-credible macroeconomic policy, which only temporarily succeeded in controlling
inflation (cf. Table 1). In the first year of stabilization considerable remonetization took
place but real money holdings end of September 2001 have not still exceeded some
historical values in the period 1994-1998.
A Cagan type of money demand, where velocity changes with expected inflation, should
explain this environment of low monetization.18
Figure 4 depicts the dynamics of inverse velocity of money (m-p-q), where m, p and q are
the logs of M1, retail price level and industrial output.
Figure 4
                       Inverse Money Velocity: (m-p-q)
As seen from Figure 4, the dynamics of money velocity, upon halting hyperinflation,
exhibited down and up movements indicating that the periods of remonetization were
immediately followed by demonetization. Thus, no upward trend in real money demand
is observed upon halting hyperinflation.
Coming to the estimation, Figure 4 suggests that (m-p-q) is stationary, which is
confirmed by unit root tests reported in Table 12 below (m-p-q=mr).
The stationarity of inverse velocity (m-p-q) implies that these variables form a long-run
relationship. The relationship shows that elasticity of real money demand (m-p) with
respect to industrial output (q) is equal to one.
Estimate of a Cagan type real money demand, where velocity depends on inflation, reads
as follows:
Period: June 1994 – October 2001
(m-p-q) = -0.314 - 0.82dp + 0.80(m-p-q)-1
                              (-3.09)   (17.02)
R
2=0.80 Q(22)=68(0.00), DH = 4.65(0.10)
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Q is the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test of order 22 with p-values in parenthesis. DH
is a Doornik-Hansen normality test with p-value in parenthesis. Dummy variable that takes value 1 for March, April
and May 1999 and 0 otherwise is included; it captures the sharp drop in industrial output due to NATO bombing. The
standard errors are estimated using the Newey-West lag window of order 12 in order to take care of autocorrelation.
Velocity depends on inflation rate and it’s lagged value. The inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable might imply either adaptive expectation or partial adjustments.
The corresponding steady state solution of real money demand is as follows.
(m-p) =  - 1.6 + q – 4.1dp          (15)19
Thus the long-run semielasticity of money demand with respect to inflation is equal to
4.1. As is well known, this type of money demand function exhibits Laffer curve
property, where inflation tax reaches maximum for certain inflation rate, and
subsequently decreases. Inflation rate for which inflation tax reaches maximum is equal
to 24% per month, i.e. equal to the inverse of semielasticity of money demand (4.1).
Thus, dynamics of real money holdings is by and large determined by inflation, as is the
case in high inflation environment. Therefore, it is credibility of economic policy and
reforms that will increase monetization of the Yugoslav economy, since the previous
prolonged periods of currency and price stability did not result in a major shift.
The estimated money demand captures well the remonetization occurred in the first year
of stabilization, which however did not exceed some historical values in the ‘90s. Thus
the experienced monetization is just another wave seen in the past, and the main
challenges for further remonetization are ahead.
One could assess the medium term prospects for the increase of money demand in
Yugoslavia by comparing current level with those achieved in successful transition
economies. As shown in Table 11, the share of M1 and base money in GDP increased
considerably in 2001, exceeding and approaching respectively maximum values in the
‘90s (cf. Table 2).
Table 11
                  Real Money Demand
                        2000    2001
M1/GDP          5.3%    8.1%
H/GDP             3.5%    4.8%
However, the monetization in Yugoslavia is still well below the levels achieved in the
advanced transition economies in their first years of reform. Thus the share of base
money in GDP, in the first half of the '90s, was twice as large in Czech Republic (10.6%)
and Poland (8.7%), and it was even higher in Romania (6.6%) (cf. Buiter, 1997, Table 1).
II.  Prices and Wages
1. Inflation and Administrative Price Adjustments
Extensive price control and repressed inflation were inherited from the previous regime.
In October 2000 all prices, apart from public utilities and some basic goods prices, were
liberalized and inflation went open (cf. Table 7). Monetary and exchange rate policy, as
explained above, put the inflation under control through March 2001. Thereafter,
administrative price adjustments came on agenda.20
The main issue concerning price policy is adjusting public utilities prices. The
outstanding problem is that of the Serbian Electricity Company (EPS).
Under the price of 0.94 cents/kWh at the beginning of 2001 EPS was far from covering
its operating costs. It is estimated that this price covers just one fifth of its economic cost.
The subsidy needed in 2001, if price adjustment would not take the place, should be
around 3% of GDP. This points to the existence of the large quasi-fiscal deficit.
The price correction included the effective price increase in April by approximately 32%,
additional 40% increase beginning of June, and 15% in October, resulting into
cumulative increase of 113%. As a consequence, the price has reached 2 cents/kWh by
the end of 2001. This is still well below normal levels of 4.5 to 5 cents, implying again
substantial subsidies in the 2002, and further price corrections in years to come.
Communal utility prices were increased in January and February 2001 by 70%. However,
it is estimated that they are still below operating cots. This is particularly true for the
most important item: district heating. In fall 2001, the price for district heating was raised
60% in Belgrade. After all corrections above, the prices for district heating cover only 40
to 60% of the corresponding costs in Serbia, suggesting additional price adjustments in
following years.
The price of gas was increased 103% in November 2000, but domestic prices are still
25% lower than import ones. The gasoline price increased from 1.3 to 1.5 DM in
December 2001 due to excise increase.
Railway tariffs were increased by 180% in 2001, but they are still below the cost. On the
other hand their relative prices, i.e. compared with prices of other means of
transportation, are approximately adjusted. Therefore, further increase of railway tariffs
would make railway transportation noncompetitive.
The prices of postal services, through the end of May 2001, covered on average 35% of
the corresponding costs. Beginning of June, these prices increased by 80%, thus reaching
two thirds of the costs.
TELECOM Serbia increased prices by 2.12 and 1.8 times for household and non-
households respectively; this was a first correction in three years.
The prices of bread increased by 65% to 135%. Prices of medicaments were also
corrected upwards in May 2001 by 80%.
It is estimated that the end of the year inflation rate for 2001 will be around 40%. We
estimate the price level increase in 2001, due to direct effects of the above relative price
adjustments, at 26%. The corresponding core inflation, encompassing indirect effects of
price adjustments and all other components is therefore 14%.21
Substantial relative price adjustment is pursued in the first year of the Program, thus
lowering quasi-fiscal deficit, but also significantly raising inflation. However, further
administrative price changes and subsidies are due next year. As a consequence, we
estimate that end of the year inflation rate in 2002 will be up to 20%.
2. Wage Dynamics and Policy
Upon price liberalization and inflation surge at the beginning of the Program, real wages
initially dropped and subsequently caught up through March 2001 (cf. Table 7). During
2001, real wages increased 4.3%, which is above non-agriculture GDP growth estimated
at 1.5%. Part of the net wage increase is due to 10% decrease of contributions to pension
and health funds which than spilled over into wage growth.
In order to assess the sustainability of average real net wage rate after one year of the
macroeconomic stabilization, one may compare it with historical average in the period
1994-98.
Figure 5
                     Real Net Wage
                      Average 1994-98 = 100
As shown in Figure 5, real wage rate in October 2001 exceeded historical benchmark of
second half of the’90s. Another way to assess the sustainability of wage rate is to express
wages in terms of foreign currency as in Figure 3 above. It can be seen that the monthly
net wages reached 200 DM in October 2001, thus approaching the maximum achieved in
second half of the’90s.
Thus in line with remonetization and real appreciation of currency, real wages also
exhausted in 2001 the initial space for expansion. Further increase of real wages hinge on
productivity growth.
One methodological remark is due. From June 2001 onwards, net wages include all
fringe benefits (holiday vouchers, hot meals etc.) since they are now taxable as well. The
new net wage is therefore higher, e.g. 230 DM in October, and hence incomparable with
the old one. For the analytical purposes, we used above the comparable old net wages.
Wage control was introduced in the public enterprises freezing their wage bill at the
January 2001 level. This was a first step towards intended restructuring of these
enterprises and preceded administrative price increases. These enterprises employ more
than 200 thousand, which makes almost 15% of those employed in social and public
enterprises. Upon demonstrating improvements in their operations, some limited wage
increases were allowed. On average, wage bill in public enterprises increased 10%22
nominally, which together with 40% inflation lead to almost 22% real decrease. Thus, the
wage control in public enterprises were important in containing overall real wage
increase. The control also diminished relative wage dispersion, since the wages in public
enterprises were generally well above the average.
Wages of those employed in public services (government, army, education, health care
etc.) are by definition under control. The total number of employees in these sectors is
around 400 thousand. These sectors exhibited different nominal wage dynamics, but on
average they together recorded real growth of approximately 7%.
3. Price and Wage Determination: Some Econometric Evidence
The inclusion the first year of stabilization in the sample (in fact thirteen months: October
2000 – October 2001) has changed the results obtained for the second half of the ‘90s
(see Section A, II).  As already discussed the exchange rate has been kept constant
through this period of stabilization, while money supply has been driven basically by an
informal currency board arrangement.
Consequently, soft Central bank (NBY) loans via banks to enterprise sector have been
abolished, implying the hardening of the budget constraint. Therefore one would expect
that wages do not depend on money supply (eq. 3) anymore. Cointegration testing
through October 2001 confirms that the relationship between wage rate and money
supply breaks down.
Furthermore, since money supply has been mainly increased through foreign currency
operations, resulting in growing foreign reserves, it has not affected exchange rate. Thus
the long-run relationship, implied by the monetary model, where money supply
determines exchange rate (eq. 2) also breaks down. This is also demonstrated by the
cointegration testing.
However, mark-up pricing still holds. Cointegration tests show that there is a long-run
relationship between logs of price level (p), wage rate (w) and exchange rate (e).
The results on unit root testing reported in the Table 12, indicate that p, w, and e are
nonstationary, and hence could cointegrate. These tests also show that inverse velocity of
money (mr = m-p-q) is stationary as stated before.
Table 12
                                Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Roots
                                               June 1994 – October 2001
  pt  et     wt mt  mrt




-1.52 -1.64 -1.04 -1.81 -3.27
Note: The number of correction is equal to 1 in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test-statistics for p, e and m, 4 for w
and 12 for mr (money deflated by prices and industrial production). The critical value for ADF, that are calculated  in the
regression with constant and trend, equals to -3.46 at the 5% significance level and 89 observations (MacKinnon, 1991).
The regression without trend is used to test for the unit root in mr, with the 5% critical value –2.90.
Cointegration testing is reported in Tables 13 – 15. Table 13 shows that the price level, wage
rate and exchange rate cointegrate, and Table 15 reports estimate of cointegration vector.
The estimate suggest that coefficients on exchange rate and wage rate might add to one, and
this hypothesis is tested and accepted as shown in Table 15 (Chi
2(1) = 0.55(0.46) does not
refute the null hypothesis that coefficients add to one).
Table 13
 Testing Cointegration among Price Level,
Wage Rate, and Exchange Rate
                                                 June 1994 – October 2001
 rank Eigenvalue  trace test
 r=0  0.31  45.87
 r£1   0.10  12.97
 r£2   0.04   3.38
Note:  There are 2 lags in the VAR.  The constant enters the VAR unrestrictedly.  The 5% critical values for the trace tests
are as follows: 29.38 for r= 0, 15.34 for  r £ 1 and 3.84 for r £ 2 (Hansen and Juselius, 1995).
Table 14
Estimated Cointegration Vector
  variable b1
   P    1
   E   -0.23
  W   -0. 76
Table 15
Estimates Under Imposed Restriction




  variable b1
   P    1
   E   -0.22
  W   -0. 78
The estimated long-run relationship reads than as follows:
p =  0.78w + 0.22e               (9)
Both prices and wages are determined by this long-run relationship, since their short-run
dynamics adjust to cointegrating vector (9). This is depicted by the their ECMs, in which
cointegrating vector (9) enters significantly. On the other hand, exchange rate does not
adjust to (9), i.e. it is weakly exogenous with respect of prices and wages.
Coefficients in the cointegrating relation (9) are very close to the corresponding
coefficients for the shorter period (cf. eq. 1) indicating the stability of the long-run
relationship between prices, wages and exchange rate.
The ECMs for prices and wages read as follows.
dp =  0.05 - 0.08(p-0.22e-0.78w)-1 + 0.41dp-1
          (3.07)  (-2.19)                             (4.23)
       +0.12de-1                                                                                         (10)
             (2.39)
R
2=0.54 Q(22)=20.87(0.52)
dw =  -0.14 +0.42(p-0.22e-0.78w)-1  + 0.45dp-1
          (-4.40)  (5.00)                                 (3.38)
           + 0.40de   + 0.19dw-4                                     (11)
            (3.62)           (2.90) 
 R
2=0.50 Q(22)=12.27(0.93)25
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Q is the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test of order 22 with p-values in parentheses. d
stands for the first difference of variables, and since the levels are logs d represent growth rate.
When compared with the ECM for the ‘90s (eq. 4), prices now (eq. 10) adjust slower to
wages and exchange rate (long-run relationship), the adjustment coefficients being -0.16
and -0.08 respectively. This could be partly explained by the fact, clarified above, that
two thirds of inflation in 2001 was governed by administrative price adjustments, and one
third by wages, and other factors.
As expected, wages do not adjust to money supply anymore, as previously in the eq. 6,
but just to the price level and exchange rate as shown by the ECM  (11). Wages adapt
much faster to long-run relationship than prices, thus offsetting in less than three months
(adjustment coefficient 0.42) any deviation from the long-run relationship.
Again, coefficients in cointegrting relation (9) add approximately to one, thus indicating
the existence of long-run relationship between real wage rate and real exchange rate.
Cointegration tests, reported in Table 16, show the presence of cointegration between real




Real Wages and Real Exchange Rate
                                                   June 1994 – October 2001
 rank Eigenvalue  trace test
 r=0   0.27  30.59
 r£1   0.03   2.69
Note:  There are 2 lags in the VAR. The constant enters the VAR unrestrictedly. The 5% critical values for the trace tests
are as follows: 15.34 for r=0 and 3.84 for  r £ 1 (Hansen and Juselius, 1995).
Table 17
Estimated Cointegration Vectors
  variable b3
(w-p)    1
 (ex-p) 0.23
The Long-run Adjustment Coefficients
  equation a26
     d(w-p) -0.28
(-4.03)
     d(ex-p)  0.06
(1.00)
Note: d stands for the first difference. t-values are given in parentheses.
Estimated cointegration vector indicates the following long-run relationship:
(w-p) = - 0.23(e-p)           (12)
The long-run elasticity (-0.23) is close to the one obtained for the shorter period (-0.25).
As previously, short-run dynamics of real wage rate adjust to long-run relationship (12),
and hence it is determined by eq. (12), while real exchange rate is weakly exogenous. The
corresponding ECM that reads as follows shows the former:
d(w-p) =  -0.07 - 0.34[(w-p)+0.23(ex-p)]-1   +0.44d(ex-p)- 0.33 d(ex-p)-1
              (-4.21)   (-4.61)                                (5.27)             (-3.68)
             +0.20d(w-p)-4                                                                                                                                                   (13)
               (3.57)
R
2=0.59 Q(22)=15.22(0.81)
Note: t-values are in parentheses. Q is the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test of order 22 with p-values in parenthesis.
The obtained trade-off between real exchange rate depreciation, i.e. increase in (e-p), and
real wage  (w-p) growth (eq. 12), is also suggested by the Figures 2 and 5 where these
series are respectively depicted. Thus above the average real wage rate, recorded by the
end of the period (cf. Figure 5) is consistent with the higher than average real value of
dinar for the same period (cf. Figure 2). They both have exhausted potential for the
additional increase within given system, and their further pace of expansion is contingent
on the productivity growth in the economy.
III.  Output: Whether Yugoslav Economy Experienced Transition Recession?27
During the 90’s, due to international embargo and mismanagement of economy, output
more than halved while capacity utilization in most industries dropped to one third. The
issue than arise whether the Yugoslav economy, upon initiating reforms, would
experience additional decrease in output, i.e. undergo transition recession. This becomes
now an empirical issue.
It is estimated that GDP will increase 5.5 to 6% in 2001, i.e. the first year of stabilization
and reforms. However, this high growth is by and large due to the recovery of agriculture
output in 2001, which increased 20% after the big draft in 2000. Still, if one focus on
non-agriculture output, the growth of approximately 1.5% is recorded. Thus there has
been no drop in output upon embarking reforms. Moreover, some 4% growth of GDP is
expected in 2002. Table 17 depicts growth by sectors estimated for 2001 and projected
for 2002.
Table 17
  Growth Rates of Output by Sectors
                                                           %











The sharp decrease in construction output is partly overestimated since private sector is
not properly covered and there is also considerable gray economy in this sector. This is
suggested by the growth of construction material industry in 2001, which gives inputs for
construction industry.
Nevertheless, the overall industry is of the main interest since its share in total output is
around one third, and it did not exhibit any growth in 2001. Thus, one may explore
whether transitional recession occurred in industry. To that end, trend-cycle component
of industrial output from 1994 through November 2001 is calculated and given in Figure
6.
Figure 6, Industrial Output: Trend-Cycle Component28
The trend-cycle is basically flat in 2001, indicating that industry did not experienced




                              2000 = 100   Index
2000 Q4                   99.2
2001 Q1                   98.8            99.6
2001 Q2                   99.2           100.4
2001 Q3                   99.1           100.0
2001 Oct., Nov.      100.5          101.4
In fact there are some signs in October and November that industry may has embarked on
the growth path.
Looking behind aggregate industrial output, one can see that certain industries, like metal
processing, automobile industry, electrical appliances etc. recorded substantial decrease
in output. These industries contain large socially owned enterprises that were affected in
2001 by the absence of the soft loans from the banking sector, which were previously
extended to them. Thus hardening the budget constraint in the course of stabilization led
to transition recession in a number of industries, but the growth of other industries offset
the recession.
In 2002, substantial growth of non-agriculture output is expected: 5% vs. 1.5% in 2001,
showing that no transitional recession is anticipated. Specifically, recovery of industrial
output is foreseen.
IV. Facing Structural Imbalances: Fiscal Adjustment
1.  Public Revenue, Expenditure and Deficit: The Size of Adjustment
1.1 Fiscal Deficit29
The public revenues in FRY in the post-hyperinflation period and before the conflict
(1994-1998) varied from 41% to 45% of GDP. The share of consolidated revenues,
obtained when mutual paying among social funds and state are offset, is approximately
two-percentage point lower. These results are comparable with some other transitional
economies. Namely, the revenue collection in FRY has neither fallen apart nor the burden
was excessive.
Unconsolidated and consolidated public revenues, for the two representative years before
conflict, are given in Table 19.
Table 19
Public revenues in FRY (%GDP)
1997  1998
Unconsolidated                     42.5%               45.0%
Consolidated                         40.5%               43.0%
The data on public expenditure in the '90s are unavailable, while their estimates indicate
that they were in the range of 43% to 46% of GDP in the period considered. These results
lead to the estimated cash deficit to the tune of about 1 to 1.5% of GDP.
However, arrears were regularly recorded in the period considered representing
additional deficit that was not monetized. The most important were pensions arrears, then
arrears towards childcare and social security welfare, as well as wages arrears in public
sector. These arrears emerged due to imbalances between entitlements and disposable
funds for servicing these entitlements. The scope of the additional fiscal deficit can be
assessed by the increase in the pension arrears and social care and child welfare arrears.
Table 20
                                                        Arrears, % GDP
1997  1998
Pensions                                  1.10              1.2030
Child care and welfare            1.12              1.47
Social security welfare            0.24              0.48
Total                                         2.46              3.15
Thus, additional deficit generated in the period considered was at least 2.5% to 3% of
GDP. When added to the estimated cash deficit one gets the fiscal deficit of 4 to 4.5% of
GDP.
Furthermore, in the ’90s the government neither honored its foreign debt or the debt to its
citizens stemming from the frozen foreign exchange accounts. Even under favorable
restructuring of foreign debt interest payments should vary around 3% of GDP, while
servicing the debt due to frozen foreign exchange accounts would be around 1%. Hence,
this further increases fiscal deficit to some 8%.
Finally, one should add non-covered losses in public companies, and in particular those
of Serbian Electricity Company (EPS) It is estimated that the subsidies equal to 3% of
GDP is needed to cover operating costs of EPS.
Although the estimates above are tentative, it might be safely concluded that the fiscal
deficit, open and hidden, was somewhere between 9% and 11% of GDP. It indicates the
size of fiscal adjustment that the Yugoslav economy faces.
In summary, one may look again at financing of the deficit. Money creation and loans
from the banking sector financed cash deficit. In particular loans were extended to
agriculture, energy sector and government among others. Arrears to pensioners were
significantly reduced in 1997, when most of the proceeds from privatizing Serbian
Telecom went to the pension fund. It is estimated that this amounts up to 4% of GDP.
Foreign debt and frozen currency deposits were not serviced, while the losses of the
Serbian Electricity Company spilled over into economy. The latter is a main cause of the
huge inters enterprise arrears present in the Yugoslav economy.
2. Fiscal Adjustment in 2001.
We shall be looking at fiscal adjustments in ’Serbia’, i.e. its budget but also social funds,
local communities and the Federal budget, thus excluding fiscal operation in Montenegro
and Kosovo. This is because the latter two pursue independently their own sets of
macroeconomic policy.31
The estimated size of fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit, i.e. 10% of GDP, strongly points to
the large fiscal adjustment as the corner stone for macroeconomic stability. This was
recognized early in the process and the planned adjustments of the overall fiscal revenues
and expenditures resulted in a budgeted deficit of 3.3% of GDP (cf. Table 21). This
deficit obviously implied big fiscal adjustment, and it looked to be a sustainable one, i.e.
could be financed. The size of the fiscal deficit was also agreed with IMF.
Table 21
Serbia: Fiscal Revenue, Expenditure and Deficit in 2001
Plan Execution
Billion dinars % of GDP Billion dinars % of GDP
Expenditure 301.2 46.4 298 43.6
Revenue 279.5 43.1 290 42.5
Deficit 21.7 3.3 8 1.2
GDP Serbia 649 683
However, as also shown in Table 21, the execution of the overall fiscal operation in 2001,
resulted into the fiscal deficit, which is just one third of the planned one. As compared to
the plans, both revenues and expenditure have decreased in real terms, i.e. as the share of
GDP. Nevertheless, expenditures decreased more than revenues relative to GDP, thus
lowering the actual fiscal deficit below the planned one.
The relative size of fiscal burden (42.5% of GDP) and expenditures (43.6% of GDP) in
the first year of reform is above the average for the transition economies (33% and
37.4%, respectively) but close to the EU border economies (38.4 and 43.2%,
respectively). (cf. Gupta et al. 2001).
In order to assess the fiscal adjustments above, one should concentrate on fiscal budget
and social funds in Serbia as they account for 85% of total expenditure, while Federal
budget accounts for 15%. Also the fiscal deficit is located in budget of Serbia, while
transfers from the budget cover deficits in social funds.
Revenues in 2000 and 2001, budgeted and executed, are reported in Table 22.
Table 22
Republic of Serbia: Government Revenues





Tax revenues 15.3 15.8 17.8
1. Personal income tax 3.6 3.7 4.632
2. Corporate income tax 0.3 0.3 0.5
3. Retail sales tax 2.5 4.3 5.5
4. Excises 0.4 3.7 3.6
5. Other tax and revenues 2.5 3.7 3.5
6. Extra-budgetary revenues







As compared to pre reform year 2000, the budget revenues in 2001 are two percentage
points of GDP higher. This is, as explained below, primarily due to tax reform and but
also measures undertaken against gray economy. The revenues from retail taxes and
personal income tax increased substantially. The revenues from excises also recorded
growth from 3% of GDP in 2000 to 3.6% in 2001.
Institutionally, the main change is that extra-budgetary revenues, including quasi-excises,
are now openly included in the budget.
The expenditures of the Government of Serbia budget are presented in Table 23.
Table 23
Republic of Serbia: Government Expenditure
In percent of GDP
2000 2001
Total 16.8 18.9
1. Wages and severance
payment
4.9 5.0





4. Transfers to households
1.5 2.5












Expenditures for these two years are not quit comparable, since there were extra
budgetary items in 2000, leading to overestimation of the relative increase in expenditure
in 2001. Still the comparisons of individual items could be made.
The main differences are in expenditures related to subsidies, transfers to households and
transfers to social funds.
The share of subsidies increased from 2.1% of GDP to in fact 4%, since just a fraction of
the loans extended from the budget is expected to be repaid. Sharp increase in subsidies is
a consequence of addressing openly the quasi-fiscal deficit, the most prominent elements
being losses of public enterprises and the support of agriculture. Soft credits from Central
bank and banking sector, and growing arrears were previously used to deal with the
quasi-fiscal deficit.
Higher transfers to households were aimed to support adverse effects of reform, and
are pursued by honoring existing entitlements and decreasing arrears. Transfers to the
social funds in 2000 were, apart from the budget, also forwarded through extra budgetary
earmarked charges; the latter is included in item ‘Other’. Even taking the latter into
account, these transfers were increased in 2001. They were covering deficits in social
funds, and almost prevented the increase in arrears.
The largest item in the budget is the wage bill in the public services, and a main challenge
facing expenditures adjustment has been to keep it under control. Namely, high
expectations were risen upon overthrow of Milosevic regime, and hence it was quite hard
to come out with only 5% real increase in wage bill, i.e. as expected GDP growth. As
shown in Table 23, wage bill was successfully kept under control because its share in
GDP recorded just a small increase. Taking the revised estimate of GDP growth of 5.5%,
the wage bill should record 6.6% growth in real terms. The relative shares within the total
wage bill have changed, specifically by above average increase of wages in Education
and decrease, in real terms, of those in Police.
Nominal expenditures in the Government of Serbia budget are to be executed as planned.
However, since actual inflation is somewhat higher than the one used for determining
nominal expenditures, real expenditures are approximately 5% lower than budgeted. The
expenditure adjustment was achieved by skipping or partially executing certain items.
Thus the servicing of the external debt has been postponed for 2002, as the agreements
with the creditors are yet to be achieved. Some budgeted reform related expenditures
have been delayed or partly executed since the full scale privatization and restructuring of
enterprises and banks are to start in 2002. On the other hand, deficits in social funds
turned to be higher than envisaged leading to larger transfers from the budget.34
In conclusion, the lower expenditures than budgeted and consequent drop in fiscal deficit
to only one third of envisaged one in 2001, are not the result of fiscal adjustments and
therefore the pressure to increase expenditure would reemerge in 2002.
Federal budget has also recorded higher revenues than planned in 2001, benefiting from
the tax reform. The main increase came from higher sale tax revenues, which Federal
budget shares with that of Serbia, but also from larger than expected import tariffs
revenues that go directly to Federal budget. Comparison with 2000 (Table 24) points to
relatively lower total revenues in 2001 and increased share of retail tax revenues. The
main item on expenditure side is that for Army. It was envisaged that its share in GDP
should decrease from 6.3% in 2000 to 4.8% in 2001. It is estimated that this share would
reach 5%. Thus, although not as planned, considerable adjustment has been achieved.
Table 24.
Federal Government Revenues
in percent of GDP
2000 2001
Total revenues 8.0 7.3















in percent of GDP
2000 200135
Total expenditure 8.0 7.3









5. Other 0.5 0.8
Monthly dynamics of the Government of Serbia budget in 2001, depicted in Figure 7,
indicate that surplus is recorded in the first five months, and then the deficit through the
end of the year.
Figure 7,
Republic of Serbia 2001: Government Revenues, Expenditure and Surplus/Deficit
The budget surplus is due primarily to the restrictions of expenditures, where some social
and reform related items were postponed, e.g. an one off support to mitigate effects of tax
reform and electricity price increases. This, restrictive fiscal stance was a reaction to the
uncertainty about conclusion of the Stand-by arrangement with IMF and about Donors
Conference to be held in June 2001.
Budget deficit broke in summer and was triggered by the two large unplanned items:
buyout of the wheat and expenditures to cover additional maintenance costs for Serbia’s
electricity utility (EPS). Although in both cases loans from the budget were extended,
small chances are that they would be serviced. Later on deficit was driven by
expenditures that could not be postponed anymore, in particular scheduled wage increase,
but also higher than envisaged transfers to the social funds.
Due to the accumulated surpluses in the first five months, cumulative deficit emerged
only by the end of August, as demonstrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8,
Republic of Serbia 2001: Cumulative Government Revenues, Expenditure and
Surplus/Deficit36
The rise of cumulative deficit initiated the borrowing from the central bank (NBY), thus
ending almost eleven months long period in which money supply was exclusively
governed by foreign exchange operations.
The dynamics of budget revenues and expenditures in 2001, explained above, have
important consequences for the next year. Namely, the increasing budget deficit in the
second half of the 2001 implies, other things constant, the higher deficit in 2002 than the
average one in 2001, i.e. 1.2% of GDP. The order of the magnitude of ‘carried-over
deficit’ can be assessed by looking at the share of the deficit in total budget expenditures,
shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Republic of Serbia 2001: Budget Surplus/Deficit as Share of Expenditure
Thus in the last quarter of 2001, the average monthly share of the deficit is around 8%,
compared to the first quarter surplus amounting nearly 15% of expenditures. Taking into
account the share of expenditure in GDP, one can estimate the last quarter 2001 deficit is
around 3.5% of GDP. The corresponding deficit for the second half of 2001 is
approximately 2.5%. The latter may be taken as a rough estimate of ‘carried over deficit’.
Financing of the budgeted fiscal deficit in 2001 (3.3% of GDP) was envisaged by foreign
grants and loans, privatization receipts and borrowing from Central bank. The absence of
privatization receipts was a main reason for downward adjustment of expenditures and
the deficit. Also, foreign grants and loans were lower than expected. The reduced deficit,
1.2% of GDP is to be financed by somewhat larger borrowing from the NBY, i.e. 0.85%
instead 0.6% and foreign grants (0.35%). Higher borrowing from NBY has been feasible
since Net Domestic Assets of NBY have decreased in 2001 as shown in Table 8 above.
3. Fiscal Adjustments in 2002: Challenges Ahead
As explained above, there is a strong upward pressure on fiscal expenditure and hence
deficit that will be carried over from the second half of 2001 to the next year. The
structural problem of growing social funds deficits should be faced in 2002. These funds
primarily account for the increasing deficit in second half of 2001.
Enterprise and bank restructuring is on agenda in 2002. This would call for additional
expenditures for labor market programs to support considerable lay off, subsidies for
enterprise sector and resources for bank rehabilitation.
Consequently, it seems that the economy of Serbia in 2002 can not avoid a sizeable
increase in relative fiscal burden and deficit. As to deficit financing, privatization receipts
foreign loans and grants that were expected in 2001 are coming early in 2002 and hence
will add to the regular 2002 revenues.37
An outlook for to 2002 indicates that the expenditures are planned to increase relative to
GDP by 6 percentage points (cf. Table 25), and revenues by 3 points, leading to the
deficit equal to 4.4% of GDP. The share of public expenditure in GDP of 50% puts the
economy of Serbia in that respect at the very top among transition economies.
Table 25
Republic of Serbia: Fiscal Revenue, Expenditure and Deficit in 2001and 2002
2001 2001 2002 2002
Billions
dinars





298.0 43.6 443 49.9
Revenue 290.0 42.5 404.6 45.6




The fiscal deficit is again to be located in the Government of Serbia budget, and the
deficits in social funds are to be covered by transfers from the budget.
Table 26
Republic of Serbia: Government Revenues, billions dinars





Tax revenues 121.4 17.8 180.7 20.4
1. Personal
income tax
31.4 4.6 44.8 5.038
2. Corporate
income tax
3.5 0.5 4.6 0.5
3. Retail sales
tax
37.6 5.5 67.9 7.6
4. Excises 24.9 3.6 38.5 4.3
5. Other tax
and revenues
24.1 3.5 24.9 2.8
The revenues of the Government of Serbia budget are envisaged to increase 2.6
percentage points of GDP (cf. Table 26). This increase is expected primarily to come out
of higher revenues from excises and retail sales tax. Excises are announced to be
increased effective beginning of 2002 which, together with higher collection, should lead
to substantial increase in revenues. Decrease in expected ‘other tax and revenues’ (cf.
Table 26) results from the lowering of the tax on financial transaction by one third. This
is the main change in taxes envisaged for 2002, and is intended to decrease financial costs
and consequently interest rates. Additionally, exemptions from retail sale tax are
envisaged through 2003, for communal utilities, basic medicaments, and a few fresh and
frozen food items.
Expenditures in the budget of Serbia are planned to increase considerably, i.e. 5.8
percentage points of GDP (cf. Table 27); this increase is just below the one in total fiscal
expenditures (cf. Table 25).
Table 27

















12.5 1.8 16.8 1.9
3. Subsidies 19.3 2.8 20.2 2.339
4. Transfers to
household
17.1 2.5 24.8 2.8
5. Transfers to
social funds
26.1 3.8 54.4 6.1
6. Interest
payment
0.7 0.1 15.5 1.7
7. Capital
expenditure
3.5 0.5 12 1.4
8. Structural
adjustment
0.6 0.1 9.7 1.1
9. General
reserves
- - 4.7 0.5
10. Frozen FX
deposits
4.2 0.6 6.2 0.7
11. Loans 9.8 1.4 - -
12. Other 2.1 0.3 9.3 1.0
Transfers to the social funds, for covering their deficits, account for a main part of
expenditure increase. This item will become the single largest one in the Government of
Serbia budget, even higher than wage bill. Social fund deficits, the largest one being that
of the pension fund, are structural problem. Thus the start of pension reform is envisaged
for early 2002 that will encompass the increase of the statutory retirement age by 3 years,
change in indexation of pensions from wage growth to the mean of wage and price
increase, and the lowering of the minimum pension to 20% of average wage. The
increasing deficit of the pension fund in second half of 2001 was largely due to
indexation of pensions to wage growth.
Restructuring of enterprises and banks, envisaged for 2001, increased structural
adjustment expenditures in the budget. Approximately 0.6% of GDP will be extended
from the budget for enterprise restructuring, and 0.5% for rehabilitation of the banking
sector. Additional 0.5% is allocated, from the transfers to households, to support those
that will be laid off due to restructuring. Also subsidies to Serbian Electrical power
company (EPS) of around 0.4% will mainly be used for its restructuring.
Capital expenditure is planned to increase substantially, one percentage point of GDP,
and more than half is going for road reconstruction.
Despite the favorable terms obtained from the Paris club, and assuming approximately
the same agreement with the London club, external debt servicing allocated to the budget
of Serbia in 2002 is 1.7% of GDP.40
Federal budget for 2002 is planned to increase a bit more than GDP, increasing its share
from 7.3 to 7.4%. It is envisaged to be a balanced budget. Revenues from import tariffs
(2.4% of GDP) are planned to increase relatively, while those from retail taxes and
excises (4% of GDP) to fall as percentage of GDP. The main item on expenditure side is
that for the Army, and they are planned at 4.9% of GDP hence decreasing its share by
0.1%. Transfer to the pension fund is now explicitly budgeted (0.6%), and the servicing
of frozen currency deposits (0.3%) is also envisaged for 2002.
Fiscal deficit equal to 4.4% of GDP, and we estimate that it’s financing could be as
follows. Privatization receipts counted upon are in the range of US$200 to 400 millions; a
major preparatory work was done in the second half of 2001. The lower bound of
privatization revenues foreseen for deficit financing, thus equals to 1.7% of GDP.
Foreign loans could be predicted at 1.1% of GDP, referring mainly to World Bank
structural adjustment credit. Anticipated foreign grants, including EU macro-financial
assistance, may be at most 1% of GDP, while the remaining deficit of 0.6% will be
covered by the borrowing from the NBY. Official stand on deficit financing is, however,
somewhat different, being more conservative with the privatization receipts and hence
looking for higher share of grants.
4.  Tax Reform
4.1 Elements of Tax Reform
A thorough tax reform in Serbia was advanced in March 2001 along with the budget for
that year. The major changes were proposed in the area of retail sales tax, excises and in
payroll contributions and taxes. These taxes account for 80% of total fiscal revenues in
Serbia. Some other taxes, e.g. corporate income tax, property tax etc., have been changed
as well. Federal Government pursued, in May 2001, reform of import tariffs.
Before tax reform, there were seven different retail sales tax rates, ranging from 1% to
28% outside Belgrade and from 1% to 31% in Belgrade, and they have been now unified
at the rate of 20%, including a separate federal tax for the Army of 3%. Retail tax
exemptions in 2001 were limited only to trade in bread and standard EU exceptions.
Some limited additional exemptions, as explained in Section 3 above, are envisaged for
2002 and 2003.
The goals of the enacted changes in retail sales tax are to reduce the allocation bias of the
previous system, avoid the strong lobbying, simplify the calculation and reduce the cost
of calculation and control. Also, the unification of retail tax rate is a good starting point
for the planned introduction of the value-added tax.41
Radical simplification of the taxation of excise products is also enacted. A consolidated
excise is introduced by combining the present excises and 4-8 charges calculated for
excise products. Except simplifying calculation, selective increase in excises is proposed.
Change in the fiscal treatment of wages and salaries are the third, and probably the most
important measure within the fiscal reform. The changes were accepted in April and have
been effective from June 2001. They encompass: a) shift to the system of gross wage,
which represent the uniform base for levying all fiscal charges on wages and salaries; b)
tax exemption for minimum wage was abolished; c) luncheon bonus and vacation
vouchers are included in gross wage; d) introduction of minimum base for each
qualification and a maximum one for levying contributions. At the same time,
contribution rates were lowered so that the reduction of fiscal burden on average wage
decreased by about 10%.
The combined effect of widening tax base, i.e. gross wage that now includes the whole
take home income, and the lowering of contribution rates have led to the reduction of
fiscal burden on take home wage from 105% to 72%.
The introduction of gross wage as the taxable base have strong impact on depressed
sectors (e.g. textile, metal processing etc.) in which the dominant part of take home
income were previously nontaxable allowances. This puts the strong pressure on them to
restructure or close down. However, in medium and long run, the introduction of gross
wage as a tax base would lead to the corresponding, higher, pensions. This is not well
understood by employees since they even before tax reform wrongly perceived take home
income as the base for their pensions.
The first steps towards fiscal decentralization have been already taken during 2001in
order to strengthen local self-government. Thus the revenues from property tax have been
exclusively allocated to local communities. As a result, the share of local communities in
fiscal revenues increased upon changes to 10.5% compared 8.4% at the beginning of
2001 and 7.8% in 2000.
4.2 Some Effects of Tax Reform
Tax reform directly affected the dynamics and structure of public revenues through
broadening the tax base, changes in burden (tax rates) and reduction of tax exemptions.
The indirect effect is achieved through improved collection due introduction of simpler
and fairer tax system.
Figures 10 to 12 show quantitative effects of tax reform on overall fiscal revenues in
Serbia and its main components. Monthly revenues, seasonally adjusted and deflated, for
2001 are shown in these Figures in order to cover both pre reform and post reform
periods.42
Figures 10 to 12
As can be seen from the Figures 10 to 12, overall fiscal revenues and retail tax revenues,
exhibit S curve dynamics. Namely, from the lower pre reform level, they start increasing
during introduction of tax reform and subsequently reach new higher levels. On the other
hand, contributions to the social funds decreased in June due to reduction in their rates by
10%.
In order to summarize quantitative effects of tax reform on fiscal revenues, we have used
deflated and seasonally adjusted data to calculate ratios of average monthly revenues
after and before reform. The results are reported in Table 28 below.
Table 27
Effects of Fiscal Reform
Index Period
     After reform/Before reform
Total revenues 119     July-Nov./Jan.-March
Retail sales tax 159 May-Nov./Jan.-March
Excises 141 May-Nov./Jan.-March
Personal income tax 135    July-Nov./Jan.-May
Import tariffs 127  June-Nov./Jan-April
Contributions to social
insurance funds 87   July-Oct./Jan.-May
Overall revenues in Serbia increased 19% in real terms upon tax reform. At the same time
the structure of public revenues has been improved, i.e. the fiscal burden has been shifted
from the factors of production to consumption. Namely, contribution rates levied on
wages have been decreased, while the retail sale tax and excises have been increased. The
lower contributions from wages have, by and large, spilled over into wage increase in the
socially owned enterprises.
Retail sale tax revenues expanded 59% after tax reform. This increase in real terms is due
to the following factors: a) the growth of average weighted tax rate; b) broadening of the
tax base and reducing the scope of exemptions; c) suppressing of smuggling and d) the
growth of the turnover volume.
While unifying sale tax rate at 20%, the average tax burden on goods and services
increased by around 17%, which approximately led to the growth of revenues by the
same percent. Broadening of the sale's tax base was mainly achieved by including all43
previous charges on excise goods into excises, on which sales tax is now levied.
The suppression of smuggling of all goods, especially the excise ones represents
additional source of real increase of retail tax revenues. The volume of turnover
increased, as shown by real wage growth of 9%, in May – October relative to January –
March. This expansion in turnover also added to real increase in retail tax revenues.
The revenues from excises were raised by 41%. The growth of revenues from excises
resulted, almost entirely, from reduction of smuggling in sales of excised goods. Namely,
the real fiscal burden upon including previous charges into now uniform excise, has
approximately remained the same for the most important excise goods. As a result of tax
reform and tax and customs administration measures, the smuggling of cigarettes has
been reduced from 50% to around 15-20% of the overall sale of cigarettes. In case of oil
derivatives the percentage of collection of excises and sale tax has reached as much as
90-95% compared to the modest 50% in the previous year. This increase is basically due
to the controversial Government of Serbia decree that restricts the raw oil import only
through pipeline and its processing to state own company, while banning import of oil
derivatives at the same time. This temporary measure was the reaction to the widespread
smuggling controlled by organized crime.
Personal income tax revenues increased 35 % upon the introduction of tax reform. This is
primarily due to the broadening of the tax base since, as explained above, all fringe
benefits are now taxable. Furthermore, the wages immediately increased upon the
reduction in contribution rates, thus adding to the personal income tax revenues.
Import tariff reform was introduced in May 2001, lowering statutory weighted protection
rate from 15% to 9%. At the same time, the actual exchange rate has been used to
determine import value as opposed to notional, lower rate before. The overall effect was
an increase in import tariffs revenues by 27% in real terms, while the effective protection
rate is estimated at 8%.
Contributions to social funds decreased by 13% as result of reducing the corresponding
rates. The decline was partly offset since lowering the rates led to almost proportional
increase in wages, thus broadening base for levying contributions.
The tax reform obviously had an impact on price increase and standard of living. Highly
distorted, pre reform, tax system was fulfilling social support function, which was not, by
definition, targeted to the poor. This is parallel to the role played by low utility prices,
explained above.
Unifying retail tax rate and sharply reducing exemptions led to direct one off price
increase by 3%, and additional 1% of indirect growth, as already mentioned while
discussing core and non core inflation above. However, tax reform caused higher increase
of the basic goods prices. We estimate that the direct effect on price increase for these
goods was around 5% and indirect one 1.5%.  This has obviously worked towards44
lowering of population’s purchasing power.
On the other hand, reduction in contribution rates by 10% resulted in almost proportional
increase in wages. Therefore, the cumulative effect of both measures on standard of
living is positive and estimated to be on average 5-6% increase. However, the effects of
tax reform are unevenly distributed, hitting adversely social layers whose wages are by
5% or more below the average in Serbia, since they previously had the large share of
non-taxable income (fringe benefits). Thus, in the case of these layers, the real wages
grew (due to lowered contributions) less than 5%, which compared to 6% increase in the
prices of basic goods, implies decrease in their real incomes.
V. Sustainability of Macroeconomic Stabilization: A Medium Term Outlook
Lasting macroeconomic stability is a precondition for economic growth, and hence it is
important to explore its viability in the medium term. The main challenge for
macroeconomic stability may come from the fiscal sector, i.e. whether fiscal deficit and
the relative size of public expenditure could be kept under control. Somewhat related
issue of servicing foreign debt and in general external sustainability, comes as a
subsequent challenge. However, the former adjustments to be viable should not impede
economic growth.
In this Section we want to explore a feasible medium term path of the economy that
would imply, both macroeconomic stability and acceptable economic growth.
Medium term forecast of selected macroeconomic indicators is reported in Table 29.
Table 29.  Forecast of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators







GDP, bill. YUD, const.   2001
prices 689.9 727.4 756.5 801.9 850.0 892.5 937.2 28.8 5.2
GDP growth rate in % 5.0 5.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0   -
Inflation, end of period in % 112.0 42.0 20.0 12.0 8.0 5.0 5.0   -
Inflation, average of the
period in % 70.0 91.0 25.1 14.0 8.2 5.1 5.0   -
GDP, bill. YUD, current
prices 361.0 727.4 946.4 1144.1 1311.6 1446.9 1595.2 119.3 17.0
Real exchange rate
appreciation, 2001.g = 100 100.0 84.0 80.3 78.2 76.7 75.2 -24.8 -5.5
GDP in bill. $US 11.2 13.9 15.4 16.7 17.9 19.2 71.2 11.4
Population, in thousands 9100 9130 9160 9190 9220 9250 1.6 0.345
GDP/pc, in $US 1230 1519 1677 1819 1942 2072 6849 11.0
Real wages, 2001  = 100 100.0 109.0 115.5 122.5 128.6 135.0 35.0 6.2
Monthly average net wage, in
DM 205 266 295 321 344 368 79.4 12.4
We have already discussed GDP growth for 2001 and 2002. The subsequent medium
term growth will be governed by new investments. The relatively high growth rates are
feasible due to comparable low marginal capital coefficients. Namely, infrastructure and
buildings, although partly ruined, are in place for the output twice as large. Marginal
capital coefficients implied by the GDP growth rates in Table 29 above and the shares of
new investments in GDP discussed below, are 1.5 and 1.6 in 2003 and 2004 respectively,
and than the coefficient increases to 2 in the next two years. Thus the new investments
should result in high increase in output.
Inflation in 2002 and 2003 will still be partly due to administrative price adjustments, and
afterwards solely due to core inflation. The low core inflation implies that the necessary
fiscal adjustments are pursued and hence fiscal deficit need not be monetized.
Furthermore, no significant cost pressures are expected. Namely, wages are projected to
grow at the rate that keeps by and large unit labor costs constant. Dinar is expected to
appreciate in real terms, thus decreasing the impact of import costs on prices.
Real appreciation of dinar in 2002 will still be mainly governed by administrative price
adjustments mostly of non-tradable goods and services, and a large carry over effect from
2001. Thereafter, real appreciation will be driven by productivity growth differentials. As
explained below, productivity growth is expected roughly to equal GDP growth. Thus
productivity growth differentials are estimated at 2.5 to 3% annually, and it is assumed
that dinar will appreciate accordingly.
Average real wage rate is projected to grow as GDP, apart from 2002 which still includes
upward effect due to the decrease in contributions (cf. Section IV,4). Currently, there is a
large latent unemployment that drives down average wage rate. It is assumed that output
growth in medium term would absorb this latent unemployment, of course not necessary
the same people, and in that sense GDP growth is due to productivity growth of currently
employed. Consequently, the same growth of productivity and wage rate would leave unit
labor costs unchanged.
Table 30
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (excludes Kosovo): Gross Domestic Product,
Expenditure Composition46
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
                 
(In percent of GDP)
GDP 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
Domestic Demand 118.0120.1 118.3 117.1 115.8 114.6 113.4
Consumption 102.8103.3 100.1 97.8 95.7 94.1 92.9
Private Consumption 84.3 84.1 80.6 79.3 77.9 76.6 75.8
Public Consumption 18.4 20.1 19.5 18.5 17.8 17.5 17.1
Investment 15.3 16.8 18.2 19.3 20.1 20.5 20.5
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 16.3 16.3 17.4 18.8 19.6 20.0 20.0
Non-government 13.1 14.7 13.4 14.3 15.1 16.0 15.2
Government 3.3 1.6 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.8
Changes in
Inventories&valuables -1.0 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Net exports of goods & services -18.0 -20.1 -18.3 -17.1 -15.8 -14.6 -13.4
Exports of Goods and Services 31.6 24.5 24.5 26.7 29.0 30.7 32.3
Imports of Goods and Services 49.6 44.6 42.8 43.8 44.8 45.3 45.7
The share of fixed investment in GDP is expected to increase from 16% in 2001 to almost
19% in 2004 and subsequently to 20%. Estimating replacement to be around 10% of
GDP, the share of new investment is projected to grow from 6% to 10%, thus driving the
growth after 2002.
Large negative external balance of goods and services at the beginning and than
decreasing over the period indicates that investments will first heavily rely on foreign
sources and only later on domestic savings. Consequently, the share of consumption in
GDP is expected to decrease from 103% in 2001 to 93% in 2006, thus opening some
space for domestic savings. This still implies growing consumption per capita, however
at the lower rate than GDP one. Sizeable downward adjustment in the share of public
expenditure on goods and services is also imperative if the room for domestic savings is
to be made.
External balance viability is an issue of low domestic savings relative to the investment
necessary to drive wanted economic growth and to service foreign debt.
Table 31 gives balance of payment: estimates for 2001 and a projection for 2002.
Table 31
Balance of payments
       
2000 2001 200247
       
(in million U.S. dollars)
  Exports of good and services 2547 2650 3071
  Imports of good and services 4004 4820 5368
  Net exports of good and services -1457 -2170 -2297
  Net factor income: net interest -63 -213
  Private remittances, net 848 1210 1100
Current account balance, before grants -609 -1023 -1410
(In percent of GDP) -7.6 -9.5 -11.2
Financing (in percent of GDP) 9.5 11.2
  Grants 4.7 4.5
  Foreign loans, net 4.7 4.3
  Foreign direct investment 0.0 2.4
Current account deficits in 2000, 2001 and 2002 are 7.6%, 9.5% and 11.3% of GDP
respectively, while after grants they are 4.2%, 4.4% and 6.9%. These deficits are
generated by the large trade deficits in these three years, while in 2002 servicing external
debt interest payment also adds to the deficit (up to 2%). Trade deficit is partly offset by
the surplus in services and private remittances. Current account deficit after grants in
2001 is financed by foreign loans from IFO, and in 2002 is expected to be covered again
by foreign loans and also FDIs.
Yugoslavia will run relatively high current account deficit even in the medium term. It is
due, first, to large external debt servicing despite favorable terms obtained from creditors.
Then, as explained above, it should substantially increase the share of investment in order
to achieve the appropriate growth that can alleviate unemployment and poverty. At the
same time, the country should experience an acceptable consumption growth so that
economic reforms remain politically feasible. Estimates of current account deficits that
would meet conditions above, i.e. follow from projections given in Tables 29 and 30 are
presented in Table 32.48
Table 32
Current Account Deficit and its Financing
         
2003 2004 2005 2006
         
(in percent in GDP)
Current Account Deficit -11.7 -11.4 -10.8 -10.3
  Grants 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.4
  Foreign Direct Investment 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.8
  Foreign Loans 4.9 5.4 4.5 4.1
(in million U.S. dollars)
Current Account Deficit -1606 -1715 -1764 -1817
  Grants 423 311 280 242
  Foreign Direct Investment 509 589 750 850
  Foreign Loans 674 815 735 725
We estimate that before grants current account deficit will vary from almost 12% to 10%
of GDP, while after grants around 8% of GDP. Even the latter deficit is very high,
questioning external sustainability. The largest current account deficits that transition
economies recorded in the period 1996 – 98, varied from 6.5% to 7.4% of GDP in the
case of Central Europe and Baltic States, and from 6.8% to 12.9% for Commonwealth of
Independent States (cf. World Bank data base).
The grants and foreign loans are expected largely from the three Donors’ conferences,
with main inflows during 2002 – 2004. The third source of financing CA deficit is
foreign direct investments (FDI), that we estimate to vary around 4% of GDP. This
estimate of FDI is in line with those recorded in transition economies in the period 1997 –
2000. In the case of Central Europe and Baltic States, the share of FDI in GDP varied
from 3.1% to 4.4%, while for Commonwealth of Independent States it was in the range of
2% to 4.5% (cf. World Bank data base).
Even after favorable write off (66%) and rescheduling of the external debt with the Paris
club, and assuming that approximately same terms would be obtained from the London
club, the debt burden is still high. Table 33 gives main external debt indicators.49
Table 33
External Debt
             
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010
             
External Debt/GDP
(%) 71.3 69.4 67.2 64.1 60.0 47.9
External Debt
Service Ratio (% of
Export) 10.3 11.9 14.2 17.9 20.6 13.7
External Debt
Service        (% of
GDP) 2.5 3.2 4.1 5.5 6.7 5.5
The indicators show that although still high, the debt service is sustainable. The ratio of
external debt to GDP is decreasing dropping to 60% in 2006 and 47.9% in 2010. External
debt service ratio, i.e. the ratio of debt service to export, reaches maximum in 2006 and
than declines. However, even at its maximum value the ratio is below the upper limit of
25%, indicating that the debt could be serviced. The share of debt servicing in GDP is
moderate in 2002 and 2003 and than increases during 2004 to 2006 due to agreed
rescheduling plan. In the latter period debt servicing becomes substantial burden
primarily for the fiscal sector, but also for balance of payment.
As explained in Section IV, the fiscal burden in 2002 is going to be very large with half
of GDP allocated for public consumption. Obviously this is not sustainable in the
medium term, implying that the share of expenditures should decrease. Some very
tentative evolution of fiscal expenditure and revenues over the medium term is presented




(In percent of GDP)
             
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010
             50
Revenue 45.6 44.5 44.3 44.1 44.0 42.0
Expenditure 49.9 49.1 48.5 48.2 48.0 45.0
Overall balance -4.4 -4.5 -4.2 -4.1 -4.0 -3.0
Financing 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.0
  Foreign grants 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0
  Foreign
borrowing 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8
  Domestic
borrowing 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.2
  Privatization
receipts 1.7 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.1 0
Some of the main expenditure items will still be present in the medium term, keeping the
share of expenditure relatively high. Specifically, restructuring costs and subsidies are
foreseen to be still significant in 2003 and partly 2004. At that time, external debt
servicing takes over by increasing considerable, i.e. to 4.1% of GDP in 2004 and than to
6.7% in 2006 (cf. Table 33).
On the other side, reform of the pension system, that is about to start in 2002, should
downsize relative expenditures on pensions and decrease the pension fund deficit in the
medium term. This would relatively decrease overall expenditures, since covering the
deficit in pension fund is the single largest item in Government of Serbia budget for 2002
(cf. Section IV, 3). The health insurance fund is also running a considerable deficit,
although smaller than the pension one. This should be also addressed in the medium term.
The share of expenditures on Army is currently at 5% of GDP, thus leaving ample of
space for the relative decrease in the medium term.51
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Figure 9Total Fiscal Revenues

























Figure 10Sales Tax Revenues




























Figure 12Contributions to Social Funds
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Figure 15